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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Environmental injustice/racism” is the disproportionately
high level of risk to high-impact environmental hazards that
certain communities or human groups, particularly people of color,
in the United States face.1 As of 2014, 134 million U.S. residents
live within the “vulnerability” zones (estimates made by a facility
of the maximum possible radius where people could be harmed by
a worst-case release of certain toxic or flammable chemicals under
EPA’s Risk Management Planning program) of 3,433 chemical
facilities.2 Of these 134 million residents, 3.8 million residents live
within the “fenceline” zones (which are areas designated as onetenth the radial distance of the vulnerability zone) closest to
potential harm from these facilities with the least time to react in
the event of a catastrophe.3 The percentage of African Americans
in fenceline zones is 75% greater than for the U.S. as a whole, and
the percentage of Latinos in fenceline zones is 60% greater than for
the U.S. as a whole.4 Additionally, the poverty rate within
fenceline zones is 50% higher than for the U.S. as a whole.5 These
statistics—and environmental injustice/racism generally—reflect
the unfair treatment and lack of involvement of certain groups
based on their race, color, national origin, or income in “the

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Environmental Justice/Environmental Racism, ENERGY JUSTICE NETWORK,
https://perma.cc/2LPQ-CC2V;
Environmental
(in)justice,
EJOLT,
https://perma.cc/X6AG-Q8PN.
ORUM ET AL., ENVTL. JUSTICE & HEALTH ALL. FOR CHEM. POL’Y REFORM, WHO’S
IN DANGER? RACE, POVERTY, AND CHEMICAL DISASTERS - A DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL DISASTER VULNERABILITY ZONES 1–2 (2014),
https://perma.cc/3JXZ-E9CG.
Id. at 1–2, 11.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”6
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan is an example of
environmental injustice/racism and its poignant relevance to many
environmental issues the United States faces in the twenty-first
century. Situated sixty-six miles northwest of Detroit, Flint has a
population of 99,802 as of 2015—55.1% African American, 39.5%
White, 3.7% Hispanic or Latino, 0.6% Native American, 0.4%
Asian, and 0.7% other races.7 Based on this demographic
breakdown, it is evident that Flint is predominately African
American. In the wake of the Flint water crisis, many Flint
residents filed a class action suit in federal district court (in the
Eastern District of Michigan): Mays v. Snyder.8 The case was
recently dismissed without prejudice by the district court,9 but
after the Flint residents filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals,10 the Sixth Circuit consolidated the case with another
similar case, reversed the dismissal, and remanded to the district
court for further adjudication on the merits.11 Neither party has
appealed the decision.12 Plaintiffs—thousands of Flint residents
affected by the water crisis—have sued multiple government

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

Learn About Environmental Justice, EPA, https://perma.cc/U4L5-U8SY
(last updated Sept. 26, 2017).
ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/4PH7-REZT.
Complaint at 1, Mays v. Snyder, No. 5:15-cv-14002, 2017 WL 445637 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 2, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, reh’g en banc denied sub nom.
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Complaint].
Mays, 2017 WL 445637, at *3.
Jiquanda Johnson, Lawyers to Appeal Dismissal of Flint Water Crisis
Lawsuit, MLIVE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/3QVF-LXXP.
Mays was consolidated on appeal with Boler v. Earley, No. 16-10323, 2016
WL 1573272 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2016). Earley, 865 F.3d at 400, 417. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal and held that plaintiffs’ Section 1983
bodily integrity claim in Mays was not precluded by the Safe Drinking Water
Act. Id. at 409. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the statute’s
text and lack of a comprehensive remedial scheme, as well as the divergent
contours of the rights and protections found in the constitutional claim,
cannot imply that Congress intended to foreclose the Section 1983 bodily
integrity claim with the Safe Drinking Water Act. Id. at 403–10.
Following the issuance of its decision, the Sixth Circuit received and denied
a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. at 391. As of the date of this Note’s
publishing, neither party has filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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officials from the City of Flint, the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”), and the State of Michigan.13
This Note examines the merits of the “bodily integrity” claim
that the Flint residents have alleged in Mays (but does not discuss
any claims asserted in Earley, the case Mays was consolidated with
on appeal), and asserts that they should be successful on this claim
on remand, assuming that the facts alleged in the Flint residents’
complaint are true. This Note outlines the alleged facts and then
discusses the existing case law on bodily integrity claims generally,
both in the non-environmental justice and environmental justice
fields. Following is an explanation of the specific bodily integrity
claim the Flint residents have made and an application of the
existing case law (from both the non-environmental justice and
environmental justice fields) to the alleged facts. Lastly, this Note
compares this federal Flint case to the parallel Flint-related state
class action suit filed with the Michigan Court of Claims.
Although there might be some legal hurdles that the Flint
residents will have to overcome, their bodily integrity claim can be
successful on remand and will likely not be precluded by federal
statute if appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, similar
bodily integrity claims should be used as a remedy for
contamination of other public drinking water sources across the
country. The Flint residents should be able to establish that: (1)
defendants’ actions occurred “under color of state law,” and (2) a
constitutional right exists and was deprived.14 The Flint residents
can best establish this by showing that defendants’ conduct was
“outrageous and shocking” to the point where it “shocks the
conscience” of the judiciary, as the defendants’ actions exhibited
“deliberate indifference” to plaintiffs’ rights to clean water.15 On
remand, no deference should be given to the district judge’s initial
dismissal of the case because the district court made virtually no
findings of fact and did not consider the merits of whether
defendants actually violated the Flint residents’ established

13.

14.
15.

Complaint, supra note 8, at 5–10. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the
Flint residents’ claims against the State of Michigan because it is
sovereignly immune from such claims under the Eleventh Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Earley, 865 F.3d at 413.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 798–99 (E.D. Mich.
2001).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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constitutional right to bodily integrity. Within the environmental
justice context specifically, the magnitude of defendants’ intrusion
on plaintiffs’ bodily integrity rights far outweighs the public health
benefit (if there is any in this case) and its innocuous effect on the
Flint residents resulting from defendants’ actions.16
Although two state cases, which deal with the addition of
fluoride to public water systems, disadvantage environmental
justice bodily integrity claims like that asserted in the federal Flint
case, other fluoride cases counter—and overcome—the force of
these two state cases. Additionally, the Michigan Court of Claims’s
decision can further bolster the Flint residents’ claim on remand
that they have established a prima facie 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”) case against defendants—as required under the second
element (that a constitutional right exists and was deprived)—
because the court held that defendants’ actions “shock the
conscience.”17 Also, the possibility of the Court of Claims denying
a damage remedy to the Flint residents is not an issue because the
Flint residents will likely be successful in suing defendants in their
individual capacities. The Flint residents can overcome the
argument that defendants are entitled to “qualified immunity”
from being sued in their individual capacities because they can
establish that: (1) the facts, considered in the light most favorable
to the Flint resident, demonstrate a constitutional violation; and
(2) the constitutional right is “clearly established.”18
II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS FROM THE
COMPLAINT
The Flint residents allege that City of Flint officials
commissioned a study in 2011 to determine if the Flint River could
be used by the City as its primary source of drinking water (in
anticipation of switching from the Detroit water system to an
alternative system governed by a regional water authority to cut
costs).19 The report found that the Flint River water was highly
corrosive and could not be consumed safely without an anti-

16.
17.
18.
19.

Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
633 (Minn. 1976).
Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 28 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
Complaint, supra note 8, at 16.
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corrosive agent to prevent lead, copper, and other heavy metals
from leaching from the lead-, copper-, and iron-based water lines.20
In 2013, Flint officials delivered this report to the MDEQ, warning
the MDEQ of these dangers.21 That same year, the Flint City
Council approved the switch to the alternative system governed by
a regional water authority and scheduled the new water source to
become operational in 2016.22 In the meantime, water from Detroit
would be made available to Flint until the transition was
complete.23 Despite this, in April 2014, the Flint Emergency
Manager ordered the City to draw water from the Flint River, even
though he knew that the corrosive River was not being treated with
anti-corrosive agents.24
Within days of the switch, the Flint residents immediately
complained to the City of Flint and the MDEQ, citing the water’s
unusual smell, color, and taste.25 Despite these repeated
complaints over an eight-month period—and the fact that
defendants were made aware in April 2014 that anti-corrosive
treatments were not being used—the City and the MDEQ
continually assured residents that the water was safe to drink.26
Additionally, MDEQ and City officials were aware of elevated
levels of Trihalomethanes (“TTHM”) in the tap water above legal
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) levels (and residents were
made aware of this by mail as well).27 Despite this, the Flint
Emergency Manager continued to deny that the water was unsafe
and did not do anything about it.28 In January 2015, the
Emergency Manager resigned, but his replacement likewise failed
to do anything about the corrosive water.29
During this same eight-month period, MDEQ officials knew of
the high lead levels and that inaccurate test results were providing
false assurances to residents about true lead levels (they were also
informed of this by an EPA representative in June 2015 and by
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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Flint officials throughout the entire eight months).30 Various
landmark studies and reports released during the spring and
summer of 2015 also showed that Flint River water levels exceeded
legal SDWA limits and that the water was having adverse health
effects on the Flint residents.31 Flint also did not keep any records
of which users had or did not have lead service pipes or plumbing—
a direct violation of federal law.32 In October 2015, Governor
Snyder ordered that Flint reconnect its water source to the Detroit
water system.33 Despite the reconnection, the Flint residents
continued to experience adverse health effects and still do at the
time of this Note’s writing and publication.34
The Flint residents filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan in November 2015.35 In the
interim, the Flint residents moved to amend the complaint, both
parties moved to add parties, and defendants moved to extend
response time.36 In late June 2016, Governor Snyder and two other
state officials named as defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which
the district court then granted in February 2017.37 The Flint
residents subsequently appealed to the Sixth Circuit,38 which
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings on the merits.39 It remains to be seen
whether either party will appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 1.
We Have Subpoenaed Documents on Behalf of the Class, FLINT WATER CLASS
ACTION, https://perma.cc/85W5-HX2B.
Johnson, supra note 10.
Id.
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2017).
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III. THE CASE LAW ON “BODILY INTEGRITY”
CLAIMS
A.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bodily Integrity Generally

The bodily integrity claim in the federal Flint case derives
from Section 1983. This section of the U.S. Code enables a person
to be compensated when another person, acting “under color of
state law,” deprives this person of a federal constitutional right.40
In order to establish a prima facie case under Section 1983,
plaintiffs must establish that: (1) the action occurred “under color
of state law” and (2) that a constitutional right exists and was
deprived.41 Meeting the first element is not difficult in cases where
those who are sued are government employees or entities who were
acting within their governmental duties and powers.42 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the first element pertains to
government actors—those who “carry a badge of authority of a
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it.”43 Such actors also
include “municipalities and other government units.”44
Aggrieved parties can assert violations of Substantive Due
Process constitutional rights under Section 1983 (from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution), regardless of how fair the procedures used to
implement the government actions at issue were.45 In general,
Substantive Due Process violations successfully brought under
Section 1983 have been limited to “matters relating to marriage,
family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.”46 Similarly,
the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the scope of
these Substantive Due Process rights.47 This historically narrow
approach also applies to one’s implied right to bodily integrity. This
implied right derives from one’s fundamental privacy right under
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the sense that nothing is more
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 72 (2016).
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1985).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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important to life and liberty than a person’s health and their
ability to control it.48 Most of the case law on this topic relates to
sexual assault, medical autonomy, and children, but
environmental justice scholars assert that, under certain
circumstances, substantive due process rights extend to polluting
activity in the form of a toxic trespass to one’s bodily integrity.49
The key inquiry in determining whether one’s fundamental
right to bodily integrity has been violated is whether the alleged
actions were “outrageous and shocking” to the point where they
“shock the conscience” of the judiciary.50 When a government
official has an opportunity beforehand to deliberate over their
committed act, the judiciary will be “shocked” if that “official acts
in a way that exhibits deliberate indifference to others’ rights.”51
An aggrieved party can satisfy “deliberate indifference” if they can
prove that the official disregarded an obvious “risk of harm” that
will likely result in a violation of a constitutional right.52
In order to rebut the “outrageous and shocking” inquiry, the
government must “provide more than minimal justification for its
action.”53 This is true because, unlike most deprivations of
property, bodily invasions most often cannot be remedied by simply
awarding the injured party money damages.54 Because the damage
is often permanent in these situations, a crucial factor in providing
more than a minimal justification is whether the action involved
“needless severity” that caused a “risk of irreversible injury to
health and danger to life itself.”55
B. Bodily Integrity Claims in the Environmental
Justice Context
Another approach courts have used to evaluate bodily
integrity claims in the environmental justice context is to balance
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Uma Outka, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L.
REV. 209, 248 (2005).
Id. at 250.
Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Waller v. Tripett, 179 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Waller v. Trippett, 49 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2002).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
Id.
Id. at 814.
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the substantial public health benefit and its innocuous effect on
the individual with the magnitude of the intrusion on one’s bodily
integrity.56 To perform this balancing test—“the Minnesota State
Board of Health balancing test”—the court must consider four
factors: (1) the importance of the state’s purpose for requiring the
environmentally harmful action; (2) the nature and magnitude of
the effect of the action on the individual; (3) whether the state’s
purpose justified intrusion of bodily integrity; and (4) whether the
means adopted by the state to accomplish its purpose were proper
and reasonable.57
In addition to the Minnesota State Board of Health balancing
test, the court must also consider whether the potential for a bodily
integrity violation through exposure to an environmental harm is
only “speculative” (which weighs against a bodily integrity
violation) or is a risk of harm likely to result in exposure (which
weighs in favor of a bodily integrity violation).58 The burden is on
the Flint residents to prove a risk of harm that is likely to result in
exposure.59 Environmental justice advocates believe this burden is
unfair and places an inappropriate presumption in favor of profitdriven polluters because proving the “potential” of the harm to
create a “risk of harm likely to result” in exposure creates a
seemingly insurmountable uncertainty problem.60 Additionally,
bodily integrity is not coextensive with the right to be free from
someone acting “under color of state law” (a government actor) who
introduces an allegedly contaminated substance into public
drinking water.61 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
weighed in on this issue specifically, federal courts throughout the
country have been consistently clear that the U.S. Constitution
does not provide the right to a contaminant-free environment.62
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
633 (Minn. 1976).
Id. at 631.
Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Outka, supra note 48, at 251.
Id.
Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 31 (Ct. App. 2005).
Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d
421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no fundamental right to be free of nonnaturally occurring radiation); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F.
Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding no constitutional right to a healthful
environment based on spraying foliage with chemical agents); Gasper v. La.
Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976) (finding

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3
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IV. THE FLINT RESIDENTS’ BODILY INTEGRITY
CLAIM
The Flint residents’ main claim is that defendants violated
Section 1983 because their actions unconstitutionally invaded
upon the Flint residents’ implied fundamental right to “bodily
integrity,” as established by Substantive Due Process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.63 Overall, the Flint residents claim that
defendants violated this right because defendants: (1) had a “duty
to protect” the Flint residents from “foreseeable risk of harm” from
the Flint River’s contaminated water; (2) “knew of serious medical
risks” from exposure to this contaminated water; (3) “failed to
protect” the Flint residents from these known risks; and (4) the
Flint residents “suffered bodily harm as a result of [this]
exposure.”64
Additionally, the Flint residents claim that defendants’
conduct was “so egregious and outrageous that it shocks the
conscience.”65 This is because, in the Flint residents’ view,
defendants made a conscious and deliberate decision to continually
expose Flint residents to toxic water while ignoring the serious
medical risks of doing so for over eighteen months.66 Lastly, the
Flint residents claim that, as both direct and proximate results of
defendants’ unconstitutional acts, they have suffered serious—and
in some cases, life-threatening and irreversible—bodily injury,
emotional turmoil, and substantial economic losses (in the form of
medical expenses and lost wages from time missed at work).67

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

no fundamental right to breathe clean air free of tobacco smoke); Molly
McNulty, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statute,
Ordinance, or Other Measure Involving Fluoridation of Public Water Supply,
78 A.L.R. 6th 229, § 7 (2012).
Complaint, supra note 8, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 2, 26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26–27.

11

2017]

Environmental Injustice/Racism in Flint, Michigan 119

V.

APPLYING THE CASE LAW TO THE ALLEGED
FACTS OF THE FEDERAL FLINT CASE

A.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bodily Integrity Generally – A
Positive Result

When the existing case law is applied to the facts alleged in
the complaint in the federal Flint case, it is evident that the bodily
integrity claim can be viable on remand. If the dismissal of the case
is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, plaintiffs will be able to
affirm that their bodily integrity claim is not precluded by the
SDWA. Conversely, if the case is not appealed on the preclusion
issue and is instead remanded to the district court in accordance
with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, the Flint residents can establish
a prima facie Section 1983 case against defendants (that (1) the
action occurred “under color of state law,” and (2) that a
constitutional right exists and was deprived). Although the Flint
residents might run into problems satisfying the second element,
the facts of the case seem to satisfy the first element of the case
law so definitively as to outweigh the potential problems with
meeting the second element.
The first element is met because all defendants, as stated in
the complaint, are employees of the State of Michigan or the City
of Flint and acted “under color of state law” within their
governmental duties and powers.68 The second element might
present issues because of how narrow the Supreme Court has
defined bodily integrity (and fundamental rights in general) from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
past.69 As discussed above, there is no established fundamental
right to be free from someone introducing an allegedly
contaminated substance into public drinking water.70
Although this is the case, the second element can be bolstered
by the notion that defendants’ actions qualify as “outrageous and
shocking.” This is because defendants acted in a way that exhibits
“deliberate indifference” to the Flint residents’ rights to clean

68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2. Issues of immunity are further discussed infra Section VII but
should not present an issue in meeting this first element.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 29 (Ct. App. 2005).
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water.71 “Deliberate indifference” is defined as when the “state
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [the victim’s]
health or safety.”72 Defendants repeatedly ignored various
complaints made by the Flint residents for eighteen months and
several warnings made over the same time period by the EPA, the
Flint-commissioned water study, and other high-profile
publications.73 One of these publications, completed during the
spring and summer of 2015 by Professor Marc Edwards of Virginia
Tech, found that 10% of the samples taken from the Flint River
had lead levels of twenty-five parts per billion—substantially in
excess of the federal limit of fifteen parts per billion—and that the
Flint River water was nineteen times more corrosive than the
water pumped from Lake Huron by the Detroit water system.74
Another such study, published in August 2015 by Dr. Mona
Hanna-Attisha of Hurley Children’s Hospital in Flint, Michigan,
found a dramatic and dangerous spike in blood lead levels in many
Flint children corresponding with the time of exposure to the
highly corrosive Flint River water.75 Both of these studies were
seemingly ignored by defendants in their decision to continually
expose the Flint residents to lead-contaminated water from the
Flint River to the point where it could be classified as “deliberate
indifference.”
Moreover, defendants knew that they did not have any record
of which users did or did not have lead service pipes or plumbing,
yet still ensured residents that the water was safe.76 In further
spite of this knowledge, defendants also repeatedly decided to not
treat the water with anti-corrosive agents.77 Through these
actions, defendants disregarded an obvious “risk of harm” likely to
result in a possible violation of bodily integrity.78 The deleterious
effects, especially to children, of prolonged lead exposure are well

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994)).
Complaint, supra note 8, at 2, 16–18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 17–19.
Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 789 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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documented.79 Also, defendants were continually informed of this
risk—both before and after they decided to switch to the Flint
River as Flint’s main source—yet did nothing about it.80
Defendants also will likely not be able to offer “more than
minimal justification for [their] action[s].”81 Such a justification is
necessary here because the Flint residents, many of whom have
suffered permanent bodily harm, cannot simply be compensated
like most other deprivations of property.82 Defendants decided to
use the Flint River as a drinking source primarily to cut costs.83
Defendants had the option to continue receiving water from Detroit
in the interim while Flint transitioned to a new regional authority,
but refused to take advantage of this option.84 Additionally,
arguing that the Flint River water was safe is not valid because
defendants were repeatedly warned to the contrary.85 The
“severity” of the effects of defendants’ actions was “needless”86
(meaning that defendants’ decision to switch to the Flint River, and
the resulting negative effects, were both avoidable) because
defendants only needed to use the Detroit interim option to avoid
this harm altogether. Instead, this unnecessary severity led to an
unjustifiable “risk of irreversible injury to health and danger to life
itself.”87
B. Bodily Integrity Claims in the Environmental
Justice Context – Another Positive Result
The four factors of the Minnesota State Board of Health
balancing test also lean in favor of the Flint residents and
constitute an alternative argument the Flint residents can make
to assert that their bodily integrity rights were violated. In terms
of factor (1) (the importance of the State’s purpose for requiring the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Lead – Childhood Lead Poisoning Data, Statistics, and Surveillance, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/P93BTAXB.
Complaint, supra note 8, at 17–19.
In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
Complaint, supra note 8, at 22.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 16–18, 20.
In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 814.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3

14

122

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 35

environmentally harmful action), saving on costs was arguably the
only reason why the state’s purpose for committing this
environmentally harmful action was important.88
In terms of factor (2) (the nature and magnitude of the effect
of the action on the individual), the nature and magnitude of the
effect is significant. Victims have suffered—and continue to
suffer—immense physical damage and injury in the form of skin
lesions and hair loss, chemically induced hypertension,
autoimmune disorders, neurological disorders like “brain fog,”
seizure, vision loss, and memory loss, and psychological disorders
like depression, chronic anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and an inability to cope with normal stress.89 Victims also have
suffered—and continue to suffer—chronic and acute abdominal
and stomach discomfort,90 chronic and acute respiratory disorders
like chronic rhinitis and aggravation of asthma,91 and an inability
to overcome (or a worsening of) developmental disorders.92
Additionally, victims have experienced—and continue to
experience—substantial economic losses in the form of property
damage and decreased property value from irreparably damaged
service line pipes,93 medical expenses,94 and lost wages from time
missed at work due to illness.95 Compared to Minnesota State
Board of Health (where there was actually a public benefit through
fluoridation of a public water source),96 the federal Flint case poses
a substantial health risk without any public benefit. Additionally,
compared to Minnesota State Board of Health (where fluoridation
of a public water source only caused innocuous effects on
individuals),97 the lead in the federal Flint case has caused
significant effects on the individuals in Flint.
In terms of factor (3) (whether the State’s purpose justified
intrusion of bodily integrity), the State’s purpose, as discussed in
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Complaint, supra note 8, at 16.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.
Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
633 (Minn. 1976).
Id.
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factor (1), does not justify intrusion of bodily integrity. In terms of
factor (4) (whether the means adopted by the State to accomplish
its purpose were proper and reasonable), the means adopted to
achieve factor (1) were not “proper and reasonable.”98 Defendants
continually ignored sound advice and warnings without any
adequate justification for doing so.99 Switching to another water
source would have been a simple fix, but defendants continually
chose not to resolve the problem.100
Furthermore, these four factors demonstrate that the Flint
residents can show that they were continually exposed to a risk of
harm likely to result in exposure, not merely a “speculative”
danger.101 This is mainly because the health effects in the federal
Flint case are well documented and have persisted for over a year.
These are not simply projected health risks.
VI. COMPARABLE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CASES TO THE FEDERAL FLINT CASE
A.

Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools – A Favorable
Outcome in the Eastern District of Michigan

One environmental justice case that parallels favorably to the
federal Flint case in the same jurisdiction is Lucero v. Detroit
Public Schools, where the Detroit Board of Education decided to
construct a new elementary school on a known contaminated
site.102 The new school consolidated two elementary schools, one of
which had a student body that was 61% Hispanic and 13% African
American, and the other 21% Hispanic and 58% African
American.103 The Board proceeded with the plan, despite a
recently published University of Michigan study that found that
the site could have a significant presence of many toxins, including
volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”), polychlorinated biphenyls

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 631.
Complaint, supra note 8, at 16–18, 20.
Id.
Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools, 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Id. at 771.
Id.
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(“PCBs”), chlorinated solvents, heavy metals, radioactive paints,
semi-VOCs, and petroleum-related materials.104
The Eastern District of Michigan (the same court that
dismissed the federal Flint case here) held that, although the
plaintiffs properly asserted a bodily integrity right, the defendants’
actions did not constitute an invasion of bodily integrity in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The court quoted
Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, where the Sixth
Circuit stated that, while a student has a Fourteenth Amendment
right to personal security and bodily integrity, there must be a
showing that the “force applied caused injury so severe, was so
disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by
malice or sadism rather than merely careless or unwise zeal that
it amounted to a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power
literally shocking to the conscience.”106 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants’ actions were based
in “malice or sadism,” and that their actions fell short of the
outrageous and shocking character required because the harm to
the students of the new school was speculative at that time, rather
than actual and imminent.107 Additionally, the court reasoned that
the site at issue that has already been found to be contaminated,
not the school facility itself, may have caused the injury.108
This outcome, although unfavorable to the Lucero plaintiffs,
favorably compares to the federal Flint case. In the federal Flint
case, plaintiffs can argue on remand that the risks of bodily harm
were more genuine and probable than in Lucero because multiple
studies documented the adverse health effects on the Flint
residents from defendants’ actions and because, on multiple
occasions, several groups notified defendants of these risks.109 In
Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, a related case about
the same Flint water crisis, the same district court acknowledged
these severe health risks as uncontested.110 Additionally, as

104. Id. at 773.
105. Id. at 799.
106. Id. (quoting Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir.
1996)).
107. Id. at 799.
108. Id. at 805.
109. Complaint, supra note 8, at 16–18, 20.
110. No. 16-10277, 2016 WL 6647348, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2016).
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discussed above, the Flint residents in the federal Flint case have
already suffered many severe health effects as a direct result of
defendants’ actions for over a year. When Khouri was appealed, the
Sixth Circuit confirmed this by denying the stay of the granting of
a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to provide city
residents with safe drinking water at point of use111: “Flint
residents continue to suffer irreparable harm from the lack of
reliable access to safe drinking water.”112 In Lucero, plaintiffs only
asserted severe potential health risks and could not offer any proof
of actual health effects because students had yet to attend the new
school and suffer from chemical exposure.
B.

The Fluoride Additive Cases – A Surmountable
Mixed Result

An issue that typically arises in bodily integrity challenges, as
evidenced by the cases discussed below, is the addition of fluoride
to public water for health benefits.113 Although groups have
brought bodily integrity claims, courts have held that there is no
fundamental right to fluoride-free public drinking water to the
point where a heightened standard of review applies.114 This does
not severely detract from the Flint residents’ argument on remand,
though, and should not preclude other aggrieved parties in other
Flint-like environmental justice cases from successfully asserting
that their bodily integrity rights were violated.
One case that exemplifies this is Coshow v. City of Escondido,
where the plaintiffs argued that fluoridating public water supplies
was similar to “compulsory mediation”—held by other courts as a
violation of bodily integrity.115 The court rejected this argument,
111. Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 844 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.
2016).
112. Id. at 549.
113. Fluoride in Water - Fluoride in Water is Safe and It Works, AM. DENTAL
ASS’N, https://perma.cc/CW9K-D54S.
114. See, e.g., Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 27–30 (Ct. App.
2005) (holding that a right to drinking water uncontaminated with fluoride
is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by either the U.S. or California
Constitutions); Quiles v. City of Boynton Beach, 802 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that inserting fluoride into public drinking
water is not akin to a “medical procedure” and is therefore not in violation
of either the U.S. or Florida Constitutions).
115. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31–32.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3

18

126

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 35

reasoning that a right to fluoride-free public water is not “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”116 This holding arguably creates problems for the
federal Flint case because it is not unreasonable to expect a court
to hold that lead-free water is likewise not deeply rooted in the
traditions of our country. This means that the federal Flint case
might not satisfy the second element of a prima facie Section 1983
claim (that a constitutional right exists and was deprived) because
a constitutional right must be deeply rooted in our country’s
traditions. Thus, there might be no constitutional right to be
violated in the federal Flint case in the first place.
However, Coshow is arguably not applicable to the federal
Flint case because of how outrageous defendants’ conduct was in
the federal Flint case compared to Coshow. Coshow was based on
city government conduct involving a widely accepted, statutorily
mandated addition of fluoride to drinking water for public health
reasons. Likewise, Michigan state regulation117 and related case
law118 permit adding fluoride to drinking water for public health
reasons. In contrast, the federal Flint case involves an attempt to
conceal deliberate indifference to public danger that defendants
knew they had created.
Another case that further illustrates this notion is Quiles v.
City of Boynton Beach, where the introduction of fluoride into the
city’s water was held as not akin to a “medical procedure.”119 The
Quiles court held this because the fluoride is added to the water
before reaching households, rather than directly into the
bloodstream—leaving intact the freedom to choose not to ingest the
fluoride.120 As a result, the plaintiffs were not compelled to ingest
the fluoride because they could filter the fluoride out of the water,
boil or distill the water, mix the water with purifying spirits, or
even purchase bottled drinking water to avoid ingesting the
fluoride.121 This case also poses a potential issue for the federal
Flint case. Like fluoride additives, it is not unreasonable for a court
116. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987)).
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.12721 (1978).
118. See Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Mich. 1965); Hastings
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
119. Quiles, 802 So. 2d at 399.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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to hold that lead in water is not a “medical procedure” because
nowhere in the complaint does it allege that defendants directly
inserted lead into the bloodstream of the Flint residents. The Flint
residents did have options other than ingesting the leadcontaminated water and had the freedom to pursue these options,
if desired.122
Although these two above fluoride cases may disadvantage
environmental justice bodily integrity claims like the one in the
federal Flint case, other fluoride cases bolster these bodily
integrity claims to the point where these two cases do not present
much of an issue. Additionally, these two fluoride cases are state
cases, meaning that the federal district court has no obligation to
follow this persuasive—not binding—precedent on remand when
considering the merits of the bodily integrity claim. A case that can
support the federal Flint case is Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, where
the court (like the cases above) held that adding fluoride did not
violate bodily integrity.123 Despite this holding, this case is
important for its reasoning. In Attaya, the court reasoned that
fluoridation was constitutionally permissible because it was
merely adding mineral properties to the water that were already
found “naturally” in some sections of the country.124 The federal
Flint case significantly differs in this regard because, unlike
fluoride, lead is a human-induced additive not “naturally” found in
the Flint River or in any water body across the country.125 Also,
lead has only negative health effects on humans when added to
public water,126 whereas fluoride can provide some added health

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, 192 So. 2d 188, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
Id. at 192.
Basic
Information
about
Lead
in
Drinking
Water,
EPA,
https://perma.cc/L9NR-B3Z5 (last updated Aug. 21, 2017).
126. Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children
Associated with the Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk
and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 283 (2016),
https://perma.cc/CY82-HKUG (discussing how lead is a potent neurotoxin
and can impact many developmental and biological processes during
childhood, especially intelligence, behavior, and overall quality of life).
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benefits if ingested in drinking water by humans,127 which
Michigan state-level case law has upheld.128
Another advantageous fluoride case is the case establishing
the Minnesota State Bd. of Health by Lawson balancing test. In
that case, the court held that fluoridation also did not violate bodily
integrity, but reasoned that the substantial health benefit (the
importance of the state purpose) outweighed the innocuous effect
on the individual and the small intrusion on one’s bodily integrity
rights (the nature and magnitude of the effect on the individual).129
As discussed above, the facts of the federal Flint case, when applied
to these four factors, favor the Flint residents. In the federal Flint
case, there is a substantial public health risk of consuming leadcontaminated water (versus a potential public health benefit of
adding fluoride to drinking water in Minnesota State Board of
Health), a significant effect on the individual of consuming lead
(versus an innocuous effect of consuming fluoride in Minnesota
State Board of Health), and an intrusion on one’s bodily integrity
rights that is large in magnitude (versus small in magnitude in
Minnesota State Board of Health).
Although some environmental justice cases within the fluoride
context do not apply favorably to the federal Flint case, the overall
body of environmental justice case law does. It allows the Flint
residents to successfully assert on remand that they have a
fundamental right to bodily integrity which was violated, because
the Flint crisis is particularly “outrageous and shocking” when
compared factually to other environmental justice cases.
VII. INSIGHTS FROM MAYS V. SNYDER – PARALLEL
MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS FLINT CASE
A subset of the federal plaintiffs filed a parallel suit at around
the same time in the State of Michigan Court of Claims against
three of the defendants from the federal case (Governor Rick
127. AM. DENTAL ASS’N, supra note 113 (discussing how fluoride is safe, prevents
tooth decay in at least 25% of children and adults, and is an effective source
of cavity protection).
128. See Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16, 24–28 (Mich. 1965);
Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009).
129. Minn. State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
633 (Minn. 1976).
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Snyder, Darnell Earley, and Jerry Ambrose).130 In this state Flint
case, the Flint residents also asserted that their fundamental due
process right to bodily integrity had been unconstitutionally
violated, but under Michigan’s state constitution.131 Although this
case is at the state level, it nevertheless supports the remanded
federal bodily integrity claim, considering that: 1) the district court
sits in the same state in which the state claim was filed, and 2) this
case derives from a very similar set of facts from the same Flint
water crisis.
Before the Court of Claims were dual motions seeking
summary disposition pursuant to Michigan statutory law; one was
brought by the state defendants (Governor Rick Snyder) and the
other by the former emergency managers (Darnell Earley and
Jerry Ambrose).132 In its decision rendered in late October 2016,
the court denied summary disposition as to all defendants, without
prejudice, for the bodily integrity claim.133 The court’s holdings
with respect to establishing a bodily integrity constitutional tort
and the availability of a damage remedy—and the court’s
reasoning for them—can further bolster the federal bodily integrity
claim on remand, considering that the Michigan due process
provision is “coextensive with the federal provision.”134
A.

Establishing the Constitutional Bodily Integrity
Tort – A Potential Benefit

The court’s discussion of establishing the constitutional tort of
bodily integrity supports the federal Flint case such that the
district court should find on remand that the Flint residents’
constitutional bodily integrity rights have been violated. In this
way, this case can further bolster the Flint residents’ claim that
they have established the second element of a prima facie Section
1983 case against defendants—that a constitutional right exists
and was deprived.
Under Michigan law, the Flint residents must plead sufficient
facts that, if proven, establish that the state officials’ actions were
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 1 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
People v. Sierb, 456 Mich. 519, 523 (1998).
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so arbitrary that they “shock the conscience”135—an identical
burden to that which the Flint residents bear for federal bodily
integrity claims. In its opinion, the Michigan Court of Claims
agreed with the Flint residents that defendants’ actions shock the
conscience.136 The court reasoned that the defendants decided to
switch to the Flint River as the source of drinking water, despite
their awareness of the dangers the water posed and the state’s
failure to conduct a scientific assessment of the suitability of the
Flint River water by that point.137 The court also reasoned that
defendants intentionally concealed data and made false
statements to downplay the health risks of using the water, even
though they had data to the contrary.138 The Flint residents in the
federal Flint case can use these same arguments—now backed by
on-point case law from the same state on the same set of facts—to
bolster its argument on remand.
In this discussion, the court also addressed Coshow (discussed
above), which defendants used to argue that the Flint residents
have not properly asserted that defendants violated their bodily
integrity rights.139 Although Coshow could weaken the federal
bodily integrity claim—because the right to lead-free water is not
deeply rooted in our nation’s traditions (as discussed above)—the
court distinguishes the state Flint case from Coshow by arguing
that Coshow, and the cases it relied on, did not address
“circumstances even remotely similar to those present in this
case.”140 In other words, the facts of Coshow precluded that court
from addressing whether bodily integrity rights are implicated
when “state actors allegedly abuse state police powers by
knowingly and intentionally delivering drinking water
contaminated with . . . dangerous levels of lead to a discrete
population and thereby create a public health emergency.”141
Therefore, the Michigan Court of Claims in the state Flint case did
not find Coshow to be persuasive. If defendants in the federal case

135. Mays., No. 16-000017-MM at 28 (citing Mettler Walloon, LLC v. Melrose
Twp., 761 N.W.2d 293, 304–07 (2008)).
136. Id. at 28.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 29.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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were to use this pivotal environmental bodily integrity case (which
is likely, as these defendants are also defendants in the federal
case), the district court, on remand, may invoke the Michigan
Court of Claims’s rationale—and hold that the Flint residents have
successfully asserted the existence and violation of a federal
constitutional bodily integrity right.
B. Availability of a Damage Remedy – A Potential
Drawback That Can Be Overcome
The Michigan state court’s discussion of the availability of a
damage remedy might reduce the federal Flint case’s likeliness of
satisfying element one of their prima facie Section 1983 case. This
is because the Flint residents have sued defendants in different
capacities in each of the state and federal cases. But, this drawback
can be overcome. In the state case, the Flint residents sued the
three defendants mentioned above (Snyder, Earley, and Ambrose)
in their official capacities only,142 whereas in the federal case, the
Flint residents sued Snyder, Earley, Ambrose, and others
exclusively in their individual capacities or in their individual as
well as official capacities.143 In the state case, the Court of Claims
held that “a damage remedy for the constitutional tort alleged”
should be recognized because no other remedy is available to the
Flint residents.144 The court reasoned that a suit against
defendants for monetary damages under Section 1983 for violating
constitutional rights cannot be maintained in a federal or state
court against a state or state official sued in his or her official
capacity due to Eleventh-Amendment immunity.145 In other
words, all defendants in the state case are not “persons” under
Section 1983 and have “sovereign immunity” under the Eleventh
Amendment.146
The issue this presents for the federal plaintiffs is that, for all
defendants, the Flint residents brought their bodily integrity claim
against them in their individual capacity or in their individual and

142. Id. at 33.
143. Amended Complaint at 7–15, Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 28
(Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
144. Mays, No. 16-000017-MM at 43.
145. Id. at 36 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990)).
146. Id. at 42.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/3

24

132

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 35

official capacities. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court, if the case
is appealed, could take the stance that the Flint residents do, in
fact, have alternative remedies available to them for all
defendants. By suing these defendants in their individual
capacities, the Flint residents in the federal case avoid the
Eleventh Amendment immunity issues presented when suing a
defendant only in their official capacity under Section 1983.
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court might not find it appropriate
on appeal to offer a damage remedy to the Flint residents in the
federal case if they can instead obtain relief by suing defendants in
their individual capacities. The Court of Claims acknowledged this
but decided to not comment on the merits of the federal claim.147
The Flint residents in the federal case can, however, overcome
this issue on remand, as it is likely that they will succeed through
this other available remedy. Since the Flint residents in the federal
case are suing all defendants in their individual capacities, all
defendants are claiming “qualified immunity” in response, which
protects government officials from being sued unless they “are
plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law.”148 In order
to assert that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity,
the Flint residents must establish that: (1) the facts, considered in
the light most favorable to the Flint residents, demonstrate a
constitutional violation; and (2) the constitutional right is “clearly
established.”149 The Flint residents have likely met the first
element because they can successfully assert that their bodily
integrity rights were violated (as discussed above).
The Flint residents have also likely met the second element
because they can assert that the “contours of the right” are
sufficiently clear that a “reasonable official” would have fair
warning to understand that her actions violate that right.150 Also,
the Flint residents can satisfy this without proving that the specific
actions in question have previously been held unlawful.151 Due to
defendants’ direct involvement in the incident, and their repeated
disregard for information provided to them about the health risks
of using the Flint River, it will be difficult for defendants to argue
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 41.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
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that a reasonable person in their positions did not or should not
have known that the Flint residents would be subject to harm.
Because the Flint residents can meet both elements,
defendants will likely not have qualified immunity on remand,
meaning that the Flint residents can successfully sue defendants
in their individual capacities.152 The sovereign immunity issue
present in the state case should therefore not be problematic for
the federal Flint residents for the first element of their prima facie
Section 1983 bodily integrity case. Moreover, the Michigan Court
of Claims noted in its opinion that its holding on whether
defendants were sovereignly immune from these claims could
change, depending on how the federal case comes out on whether
the relief sought by the Flint residents is only “prospective” or
something more.153
VIII. CONCLUSION
By applying the relevant case law to the facts of the federal
Flint case, and by comparing the federal Flint case to the abovediscussed environmental justice cases, the bodily integrity claim
should succeed on remand. If the case is appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Flint residents would likely be able to affirm
the holding that the SDWA does not preclude their bodily integrity
claim. Even though the Flint residents can assert this, they could
have trouble on remand establishing that a constitutional right
exists, especially given some of the fluoride cases discussed above.
Yet, it is a challenge that the Flint residents can overcome,
considering how favorably the facts apply to existing case law in
the bodily integrity and environmental justice contexts.
152. The Sixth Circuit discussed the issue of qualified immunity in its opinion
but decided not to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the case on that
basis. Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 416 (6th Cir. 2017). The court concluded
this because it acknowledged that applying the facts to both elements of the
qualified immunity test would involve ruling on the merits of the
constitutional bodily integrity claim, which it left to the district court to
determine on remand. Id. at 416–17.
153. Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM, at 35 n.11 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit discussed how the relief sought by the Flint
residents is “prospective,” as the relief’s main purpose is to direct the
Governor to provide services to those affected by the crisis itself, not simply
cost the state money. Earley, 865 F.3d at 412. As a result, the court held that
only the State of Michigan was sovereignly immune from the bodily integrity
claim, not the Governor or any other state defendant. Id. at 413–14.
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Additionally, the parallel case from the Michigan Court of Claims
further supports the Flint residents’ argument and strongly
suggests a favorable outcome for the federal claim. Moving
forward, bodily integrity claims can continue to provide relief to
victims of the Flint water crisis and in other similar environmental
justice crises nationwide. The prospects are good that bodily
integrity claims can provide victims with an adequate remedy and
can help mitigate the disproportionately high level of harm
minority populations in this country face in the wake of
environmental disasters.154

154. EJOLT, supra note 1; ENERGY JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 1.

27

